C
ryptography is fundamentally important for information security, whether the information is data in transit over the Internet or at rest on storage devices. Today, the security of data protected by cryptography depends not on secret algorithms, but primarily on having strong keys and keeping them secret.
Generating strong cryptographic keys is no simple matter, however. Experts recommend using deterministic random bit generators (DRBGs), but the sequence of numbers generated by a DRBG can be traced predictably to the seed (initial value) supplied to the generator. Knowing the seed, one can reconstruct the number sequence produced by a particular DRBG. Thus, DRBGs must be seeded with hard-to-guess random data from a reliable source.
In information theory, such so-called "high-entropy" sources provide true randomness. They're usually based on nondeterministic physical processes such as ring oscillators or some kind of quantum behavior. Most practical computer systems rely on events like mouse movements, keyboard stroke timings, network events, and hard-disk access times to generate hard-toguess random data for seeding DRBGs. Although sometimes plausible, such sources often provide a limited amount of unpredictability-that is, low entropybecause, as in the case of headless or other embedded devices, they lack these sources of unpredictability.
This problem is exacerbated in cloud computing environments, which often lack the sources of nondeterminism harnessed by traditional computers for harvesting entropy. Cloud service providers typically use a single reference image of a guest virtual machine (VM)-a "golden" image-in order to create multiple instances of it in response to user demand. Each instance often has very limited ability to harvest randomness.
Another domain with a strong demand for good cryptographic keys is the Internet of Things. IoT devices tend to be small and resource constrained, but their functional capabilities span a wide range. It's reasonable to conclude that some types of IoT devices with network connectivity and modest computational power to perform asymmetric cryptographic operations would bene t from an entropy service architecture.
RECENT EXPLOITS OF POOR ENTROPY
Concerns about cryptographic keys' potential weakness aren't just theoretical, as evidenced by some recent real-life examples of catastrophic security breaches resulting from poorly constructed or predictable crypt ographic keys.
Boot-time "entropy hole"
A study by researchers at the University of California, San Diego (UCSD) and the University of Michigan (UM) provided one of the most comprehensive Internet-wide searches of Transport Layer Security (TLS) and Secure Shell (SSH) servers to date, checking . million TLS and million SSH hosts. The study results were alarming: percent of TLS and percent of SSH hosts shared keys because of insu cient entropy from the source used, allowing the researchers to actually calculate the private keys of . percent of TLS hosts and percent of SSH hosts.
The study showed that almost all vulnerable hosts were embedded network devices like routers or rewalls.
Such hosts often run a pared-down Linux kernel and don't have the usual random events from input devices that a desktop computer would have. This creates an "entropy hole," in which the output of /dev/urandom could be constant across multiple boots for a period of time early in the boot process. In one case, the same key was generated in over percent of boots.
Entropy starvation in embedded devices
We built on the approaches used in the UCSD/UM study to investigate the strength of Linux kernel entropy sources. In particular, we simulated the behavior of an embedded device, without a hard drive or a keyboard/ mouse, always starting with an empty entropy pool (no seed). We built a pared-down Linux kernel with di erent combinations of kernel entropy input devices disabled. Depending on the combination of sources disabled, the entropy count in the pool took anywhere from to seconds to generate the bare-minimum threshold of bits, indicated by the red dotted line in Figure . More time was needed to reach the threshold when some contributing entropy sources were turned o , simulating environments with constrained resources.
Our experiment illustrates the potential weakness of Linux kernel entropy sources in embedded Internet deployments-for example, in cloud environments. We observed particularly strong demand for entropy through the nonblocking /dev/urandom interface, with requests as high as , bits shortly after boot when little random data is accumulated. In fact, this Linux behavior opened the door for the exploits described by the UCSD/UM researchers.
ENTROPY AS A SERVICE
The security issues resulting from the effects of poor entropy illustrate the fundamental importance of good randomness for security. The existing technological headwinds that hinder the implementation of robust random bit-generation capabilities in conventional computing devices make apparent the need for alternative means of providing high-quality entropy to devices that cannot produce their own in sufficient quantity or quality. The widely available and highly redundant nature of the Internet creates an effective medium by which to provide good random data to clients, in this case using a Representational State Transfer (REST; www.restapitutorial .com) interface, in the form of entropy as a service (EaaS). Instead of relying solely on weak pseudorandom data in classical computers, EaaS provides a novel and secure way of delivering high-entropy data to requesting devices. It also leverages existing protocols and technologies, which makes adoption easy. EaaS scales across diverse geopolitical locales, remaining trustworthy unless much of the collective is compromised.
Secure entropy transfer
EaaS uses HTTP to transfer entropy payloads from the service to clients. To secure this transmission, the server encrypts the data using the client's provided public key and digitally signs the payload with the server's own private key.
The client makes an HTTP GET request to the EaaS server with the number of bytes of random data to return and its own public key, which is used to encrypt the returned payload. The structure of the server's XML response is as follows: <response> <entropy> encrypted base64-encoded random data </entropy> <timestamp></timestamp> <dsig></dsig> </response> Here, <entropy> connotes the payload, encoded in base64 format, and <dsig> is the digital signature.
Resolving the chickenand-egg conundrum
Clients need a public key to initially access EaaS and request high-entropy data to strengthen their key-generation capabilities. How can a client get a strong public key? It's much easier and cheaper to generate strong keys out of band than to implement robust random bit-generation capabilities in conventional devices. Manufacturers can, and often do, generate strong keys in the factory and provision them on devices. This key-provisioning model is widely used in many industries, including smartcard and Trusted Platform Module (TPM) manufacturing. Upon receiving a shipment of devices to deploy, a customer also receives through independent means the secrets required to change the factory keys on each device and assume ownership of the devices.
To break this well-known provisioning model and take control of a deployed device, an attacker must penetrate the factory security and record every device key issued as well as monitor every interaction between a device and EaaS. Missing just one such interaction would defeat the attack. This sets a high security bar for attackers.
Another mitigation against potential attacks is to always mix the externally obtained random data with locally generated pseudorandom data using suitable cryptographic mechanisms, such as hashing, and to renew the EaaS access key on each round, as Figure 2 shows. Note that the mechanism for updating the client key can provide perfect forward secrecy.
EaaS ARCHITECTURE
The EaaS architecture, shown in Figure 3 , consists of two main parts: the server side and the client side. The critical components are the entropy source, the EaaS server, and a secure device in client systems capable of providing strong isolation and protection of cryptographic keys stored inside the device and offering a set of basic crypto graphic services.
The EaaS server is continuously fed random data from the attached quantum source. The data enters a FIFO (first in, first out)-like buffer in the server's RAM, and, when a client request arrives, the server reads the top value from the buffer, signs and encrypts it, and then sends it to the requester. The FIFO buffer shifts after every request and when new data comes from the random source. The EaaS server ensures that the FIFO buffer is erased prior to server shutdown and never paged to disk. Open implementations can help ensure that this actually occurs.
The client system consists of a classic computing device enabled with a dedicated hardware component capable of storing secret cryptographic keys and seeds. A dedicated software application bridges the communication between EaaS and the hardware component. Examples of secure hardware components are the TPM, TrustZone technology in ARM processors, and Identity Protection Technology in Intel processors. If a client system or device doesn't have a secure hardware component, it can still use EaaS. The presence of a hardware component simply provides further guarantees to the system or device user, when present.
BUILT-IN ATTACK MITIGATIONS
An important feature of EaaS is that it transfers entropy to clients in a secure fashion.
As Figure 3 shows, the server response's timestamp and digital signature allow the client to verify the authenticity of both. Timestamping in particular prevents response-replay attacks. The digital signature protects against both man-in-the-middle attacks-when a malicious actor intercepts messages and serves as a relayand Domain Name System (DNS) poisoning attacks, in which a malicious actor either intercepts DNS requests or sets up a spoof server near the victim, provided the EaaS public key is provisioned on the client in advance.
Attacks involving dishonest or curious EaaS server instances are mitigated by mixing data from several sources together before use. Thus, even if multiple EaaS instances were somehow colluding against a specific client, if the client can access just one source of noncolluding entropy, including its own weak entropy pool, the efforts of the malicious instances are mitigated, as they have no way of knowing the input from the other, good sources.
REAL-WORLD USES
One useful application of EaaS is in assessing the security strength of an enterprise system. The strength of cryptographic keys being generated at the system endpoints is of great importance for this task. Endpoints using EaaS can attest the strength of keys generated from data coming from a known good source. Additionally, enterprises could set up their own internal EaaS, and have complete trust over their endpoints' entropy.
Another real-world application is VM orchestration in cloud computing environments. Two VM instances instantiated from a common ("golden") image can demonstrate similar or even identical internal states of the local entropy pool, so gaining insight into one would yield insight into the other. However, this is easily remedied by using EaaS to feed unique random data into the image after cloning, or by requesting some EaaS data upon boot.
Another important use case is that of embedded Internet devices that might be entropy starved. 2 One way to fix this is to use EaaS to obtain entropy on devices upon boot. The devices could also store some entropy across boot cycles. Thus, a device would only be vulnerable for a few seconds after the initial boot, until the EaaS call is made, and simple design decisions could prevent key generation in this small window of time. Figure 4 shows how seeding Linux with EaaS upon boot greatly improves the behavior of the Linux Kernel Process Scheduler (LKPS), a critical component of the operating system. To implement fair and efficient process scheduling, the LKPS acquires random data through a blocking interface, and it can only do so when sufficient entropy has accumulated in the kernel. When Linux is seeded with EaaS, the LKPS acquires its first random seed after about half the time needed in the case of nonseeding. The black oval in the lower part of the figure indicates missed LKPS seeding due to a lack of sufficient entropy in the kernel. In other words, the LKPS reaches its normal operational regime much faster when Linux is seeded from the start, thereby improving the OS's overall stability and performance without any additional design or configuration changes.
T he proverbial Achilles' heel of cryptographic security protection is the lack of strength of the keys used to protect critical data. EaaS stands to serve as the basis of a future ecosystem of servers that can provide verifiably high-quality entropy to clients on request, thereby unlocking cryptography's full potential.
To facilitate the creation of such an ecosystem, we plan to share our server implementation, allowing other organizations or entities to review, adopt, and host their own EaaS instances. We also envision the need to develop criteria for establishing trustworthiness of servers participating in the ecosystem. This, in turn, would let EaaS users select and rely on a subset of servers from the ecosystem that satisfies a desired level of trust/risk.
We welcome input and comments regarding EaaS. Selected CS articles and columns are also available for free at http://ComputingNow .computer.org.
